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Abstract
The insight of the BMS logical framework (pro-
posed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki) is to repre-
sent how an event is perceived by several agents
very similarly to the way one represents how a
static situation is perceived by them: by means
of a Kripke model. There are however some dif-
ferences between the definitions of an epistemic
model (representing the static situation) and an
event model. In this paper we restore the sym-
metry. The resulting logical framework allows,
unlike any other one, to express statements about
ongoing events and to model the fact that our per-
ception of events (and not only of the static situa-
tion) can also be updated due to other events. We
axiomatize it and prove its decidability. Finally,
we show that it embeds the BMS one if we add
common belief operators.
Dynamic epistemic logic deals with the issue of represent-
ing from a logical point of view the beliefs of several agents
(about a given situation) and how these beliefs change
over time as new events occur [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007].
One of the most influential framework in this field
has been proposed by Baltag, Moss and Solecki (to
which we refer by the term BMS, [Baltag et al., 1998,
Baltag and Moss, 2004]). Their insight is to represent the
agents’ beliefs about an event occurring completely sim-
ilarly to the way the agents’ beliefs about the static situ-
ation are represented: by means of a Kripke model. They
then propose an update operation between these two Kripke
models (one representing the initial situation and one repre-
senting the event) which yields a new Kripke model repre-
senting the agents’ beliefs about the situation after the event
has taken place. However, the events considered there are
assumed to be instantaneous, at least from a formal point
of view. This is a strong idealization because very often
in everyday life, events take time: “a tub is being filled”,
“Ann is going to her office”, “a computer program is run-
ning”. . . In that case we might talk of processes instead
of (lasting) events, although we will use the general term
event throughout the paper. Besides, the BMS language can
only express statements about what is true before or after
an event occurs and not while an event is occurring. More-
over, it can neither express that an event is currently oc-
curring nor express some static properties about the world
together with the fact that an event is occurring, such as:
“the tub is not full and it is being filled”. Actually these
kinds of statement are widespread in natural languages, and
it seems natural to expect from a logical framework to be
able to express them if one wants for example to formally
represent a given situation or talk in an abstract way about
ongoing computation processes and programs.
Besides, this idealization precludes the logical study of
important properties of the dynamics of beliefs. In-
deed, it hides the fact that the agents’ beliefs about
events/processes, and not only about the static situation,
can also change over time due to other events (in which
they are temporally included). For example, assume that
Ann and Bob do not know whether tub 1 or tub 2 is being
filled. This (lasting) event can be described by a first event
model. Now assume that one privately tells Bob that tub 1
is actually being filled. This new event triggers an update
of the initial event so that Bob knows that tub 1 is being
filled whereas Ann still does not know whether tub 1 or tub
2 is being filled. Formally, as we will see, this creates a
kind of hierarchy among events.
The aim of this paper is to give a formal account of these
phenomena by extending and refining the BMS framework,
and to propose a unified language which can express state-
ments of the kind above. The paper is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 1, we briefly recall and review the BMS
framework. In Section 2, we propose a new definition of
event models together with a simple and natural language
for them. In Section 3, we propose a generic product up-
date between event models which generalizes the BMS up-
date product. In Section 4, we propose a general dynamic
language that can express statements about the situation as
well as the current events occurring in this situation. We
then axiomatize it and show that the BMS system can be
embedded in our framework if we add common belief op-
erators. Finally, in Section 5 we compare our framework
with related works and notably with process logics.
1 The BMS framework
Let Φ be a finite set of propositional letters also called
atomic facts and let G be a finite set of agents.
Epistemic models are tuples of the formM = (W,R, V ),
where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, V : Φ →
2W a valuation and R : G → 2W×W assigns an ac-
cessibility relation to each agent. We write Rj = R(j)
and Rj(w) = {w′ ∈ W | Rj(w,w′)}. When we have
v ∈ Rj(w) then in world w agent j considers world v as
being possible. The epistemic language for epistemic mod-
els is defined as follows:
Le : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Bjϕ | CGϕ
where p ranges over Φ and j over G. Bjϕ reads ‘agents
j believes ϕ’ and CGϕ reads ‘it is common belief among
the agents G that ϕ is true’. The degree of a formula
without common belief deg(ϕ) is defined inductively as
usual.1 The truth conditions for this language are defined
inductively as follows. Let w ∈ W . M,w |= p iff
w ∈ V (p);M,w |= ¬ϕ iff notM,w |= ϕ;M,w |= ϕ∧ϕ′
iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ϕ′; M,w |= Bjϕ iff for
all v ∈ Rj(w) M,v |= ϕ; M,w |= CGϕ iff for all
v ∈
(
∪
j∈G
Rj
)+
(w) M,v |= ϕ.2 See [Fagin et al., 1995]
for details.
Example 1.1. (‘tub’ example) Assume there are two tubs
and two agents Ann and Bob. They both know that at least
one tub is not full but they do not know which one and
this is even common belief. Tub 2 is actually full but tub
1 is not. This situation is depicted in the epistemic model
(M0, w0a) of Figure 1. The boxed world w0a represents the
actual world. The accessibility relations are represented by
arrows indexed by A (standing for Ann) or B (standing for
Bob). The propositional letter p0 (resp. q0) stands for ‘tub
2 (resp. tub 1) is full’. So we have M0, w0a |= CG(¬p0 ∨
¬q0): ‘it is common belief among Ann and Bob that at least
one tub is not full’. J
Event models are very similar to epistemic models and
are of the form A = (E,R, Pre, Post), where E is
a finite and non-empty set, Pre : E → L, Post :
Φ × E → L and R : G → 2W×W are functions.
When we have b ∈ Rj(a) then the occurrence of a is
perceived by agent j as being possibly the occurrence of
b. Informally, Pre(a) is the precondition that a world
1deg(p) = 0, deg(¬ϕ) = deg(ϕ), deg(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) =
max{deg(ϕ), deg(ϕ′)}, deg(Bjϕ) = deg(ϕ) + 1.
2If R is a relation, we define R+(w) = {v| there is w =
w1, . . . , wn = v such that wiRwi+1}.
w0a : p
0,¬q0
A,B
A,B
v0 : ¬p0, q0
A,B
u0 : ¬p0,¬q0
A,B
A,B
A,B
Figure 1: ‘tub’ example. (M0, w0a)
must fulfill so that possible event a can take place in this
world. For example Pre(a) = > means that event a
can take place in any world. Post(p, a) specifies which
conditions a possible world should fulfill so that propo-
sitional letter p is true in the resulting world after event
a has occurred (this function was originally introduced
in [van Benthem et al., 2006, van Ditmarsch et al., 2005]).
However, note that unlike epistemic models, there is no val-
uation and also no (natural) language for event models to
describe and talk about events.
Product update. Given M = (W,R, V ) and A =
(E,R, Pre, Post), their product update M ⊗ A =
(W ′, R′, V ′) is an epistemic model describing the new sit-
uation after the event described by A occurred in the sit-
uation described by M . The new set of possible worlds
is W ′ = {(w, a) | M,w |= Pre(a)}, the new valuation
is V ′(p) = {(w, a) | M,w |= Post(p, w)}, and the new
accessibility relation is defined by (v, b) ∈ Rj(w, a) iff
v ∈ Rj(w) and b ∈ Rj(a).
The BMS language LBMS(A) is inspired from the
one of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [Pratt, 1976,
Harel et al., 2000] and takes as argument an event model
A. It is just the epistemic one enriched with a new modal-
ity [A, a]ϕ which reads ‘after any execution of event a, ϕ
is true’. Its truth condition is as follows:
M,w |= [A, a]ϕ iff
M,w |= Pre(a) impliesM ⊗A, (w, a) |= ϕ
Note that the event model A, which a priori is a semantic
object, is given in the very definition of the syntax of the
language.
2 Languages for event models
In this section we are going to restore the symmetry be-
tween epistemic and event models.
2.1 Syntax
Let Φ0, . . . ,ΦN be finite and disjoint sets of propositional
letters.
Definition 2.1. Let i ∈ {0, . . . , N}. The language Li is
defined inductively as follows
Li : ϕi ::= pi | ¬ϕi | ϕi ∧ ϕi | Bjϕi
where pi ranges over Φi and j over G. 〈Bj〉ϕi abbreviates
¬Bj¬ϕi. Eϕi abbreviates
∧
j∈G
Bjϕ and Enϕi is defined
inductively by E0ϕi = ϕi and En+1ϕi = EEnϕi. We
also note Lin = {ϕi ∈ Li | deg(ϕi) ≤ n} and by notation,
ϕi ∈ Li for all i ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
The propositional letters pi ∈ Φi for i ≥ 1 are called
atomic events (of type i) and the propositional letters p0 ∈
Φ0 are called atomic facts. J
Language L0 corresponds to the classical epistemic lan-
guage Le of Section 1 (without common belief). The other
languages Li for i ≥ 1 are used to describe (types of)
events. Atomic events pi for i ≥ 1 describe events, just
as atomic facts p0 describe static properties of the world.
For example p1 = ‘Ann shows her red card to Bob’, p2
= ‘one truthfully announces that tub 2 is being filled’, r3
= ‘Claire is observing Ann observing Bob opening the
box’. . . Generally, atomic events are of the form ‘something
is happening’, ‘somebody is doing something’ whereas
atomic facts are of the form ‘something has this static prop-
erty’. Besides, the occurrence of these atomic events might
change some properties of the world, unlike atomic facts.
The negation ¬pi of an atomic event pi should be inter-
preted as ‘the atomic event pi is not occurring’. However,
this does not mean that another ‘opposite’ event is neces-
sarily occurring.
Moreover, these atomic events might have preconditions.
For example, the precondition that ‘Ann shows her red
card to Bob’ (p1) is that ‘Ann has the red card’ (rA):
Pre(p1) = rA. The precondition that ‘one truthfully an-
nounces that tub 2 is being filled’ (p2) is that ‘tub 2 is being
filled’ (p1): Pre(p2) = p1. The precondition that ‘Claire is
observing Ann observing Bob opening the box’ (r3) is that
‘Ann is observing Bob opening the box’ (r2) whose precon-
dition is that ‘Bob is opening the box’ (r1): Pre(r3) = r2
and Pre(r2) = r1. Note that in these last two examples the
preconditions of (atomic) events are also events. This mo-
tivates our introduction of different types of events and this
also leads us to introduce a precondition function which
assigns to every atomic event pi a formula of Lk, for some
k 6= i.
Definition 2.2. Pre : Φ1 ∪ . . . ∪ ΦN → L0 ∪ . . . ∪ LN is
a function such that for all i ≥ 1, there is a unique k 6= i
such that for all pi ∈ Φi, Pre(pi) ∈ Lk.
In that case, we (abusively) write Pre(i) = k or i ∈
Pre−1(k). So ({0, . . . , N}, P re−1) is a directed graph
and we assume in this paper that it is a rooted tree with
root 0. J
Note that because the atomic events of Φi are supposed to
describe a particular type of event i, we assume that their
preconditions should deal with the same type of event k (or
with properties of the world) described by some Lk. If this
is not the case then the set Φi should be split up in subsets
each dealing with a more specific type of event.
Moreover, the occurrence of atomic events might change
the truth value of some atomic facts or of some other atomic
events. For instance, the occurrence of the atomic event
q1=‘tub 1 is being filled’ affects the atomic fact q0=‘tub 1
is full’: after the occurrence of q1, the atomic fact q0 is true.
Likewise, pressing on a button b might trigger the filling of
tub 2 (even if tub 1 is already being filled). So after the oc-
currence of the atomic event r2=‘Ann presses button b’ the
atomic event p1=‘tub 2 is being filled’ is true. This leads us
to introduce a postcondition function which specifies some
sufficient conditions for a propositional letter to be true in
case an atomic event occurs.
Definition 2.3. For all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k ∈
{0, . . . , N} such that Pre(i) = k, we define a function
Post(i, k) : Φk × Φi → Lk. Post(i, k) is abusively writ-
ten Post. J
Post(pk, pi) is a sufficient condition before the occurrence
of pi for pk to be true after the occurrence of pi. So in the
tub example, Post(q0, p1) = > and Post(p0, p1) = p0 ,
where we recall that p0=‘tub 2 is full’.
2.2 Semantics
We are now ready to define a semantics for this hierarchy
of languages.
Definition 2.4. Let i ∈ {0, . . . , N}. A Li-model M i is a
tripleM i = (W i, Ri, V i) such that
• W i is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• Ri : G → 2W i×W i assigns an accessibility relation
to each agent;
• V i : Φi → 2W i assigns a set of possible worlds to
each propositional letter.
We write wi ∈ M i for wi ∈ W i and (M i, wi) is called a
pointed Li-model. J
So a Li-model is just an epistemic model where the set of
propositional letters is Φi. The truth conditions are also
identical to the ones of epistemic logic:
Definition 2.5. Let i ∈ {0, . . . , N}. Let M i be a Li-
model, wi ∈ M i and ϕi ∈ Li. M i, wi |= ϕi is defined
inductively as follows:
M i, wi |= pi iff wi ∈ V (pi)
M i, wi |= ¬ϕi iff notM i, wi |= ϕi
M i, wi |= ϕi ∧ ψi iff M i, wi |= ϕi andM i, wi |= ψi
M i, wi |= Bjϕi iff for all vi ∈ Rj(wi),M i, vi |= ϕi
We write M i |= ϕi when M i, wi |= ϕi for all wi ∈ M i,
and |=i ϕi when for all Li-modelM i,M i |= ϕi. J
So the Li-models are free of the precondition and postcon-
dition functions Pre and Post that were present in the def-
inition of event models. However, given a Li-model M i
and wi ∈M i, we can get back the usual preconditions and
postconditions Pre(wi) and Post(p, wi) of event models:
Definition 2.6. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, k = Pre(i) and pk ∈
Φk. Let M i be a Li-model and wi ∈ M i. Pre(wi) and
Post(pk, wi) are defined as follows.
• Pre(wi) = ∧{Pre(pi) |M i, wi |= pi};
• Post(pk, wi) =

∨{Post(pk, pi) |M i, wi |= pi}
ifM i, wi |= pi for some pi ∈ Φi
pk otherwise.
J
For Pre(wi), we take the conjunction of the relevant
Pre(pi)s because these are necessary conditions for the
possible event wi to take place. On the other hand,
for Post(pk, wi) we take the disjunction of the relevant
Post(pk, pi)s because these are sufficient conditions for pk
to be true after the occurrence of wi. Besides, if wi is the
event where nothing happens, i.e. M i, wi |= ¬pi for all
pi ∈ Φi, then the truth values of the pks should not change.
Finally we introduce a particular kind of Li-model which
will be used in Section 4. For i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we define
M i,∅ = ({wi,∅}, Ri,∅, V i,∅) where V i,∅(pi) = ∅ for all
pi ∈ Φi, and Ri,∅j (wi,∅) = {wi,∅} for all j ∈ G. So M i,∅
represents the event whereby nothing happens and this is
common belief among the agents.
2.3 Axiomatization
The axiomatization for the class of Li-models is the same
as the one for epistemic models.
Definition 2.7. Let i ∈ {0, . . . , N}. The logic Li for the
languageLi is defined by the following axiom schemes and
inference rules. We write `i ϕi for ϕi ∈ Li.
Taut All propositional axiom schemes and
inference rules
Ki `i Bj(ϕi → ψi)→ (Bjϕi → Bjψi)
for all j ∈ G
Neci If `i ϕi then `i Bjϕi for all j ∈ G
J
Theorem 2.8 ([Fagin et al., 1995]). Let i ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
For all ϕi ∈ Li, |=i ϕi iff `i ϕi.
Theorem 2.9 ([Fagin et al., 1995]). For all
i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, Li is decidable.
2.4 Examples
Example 2.10. (‘card’ example) This example shows that
possible events of event models can be the combination of
more elementary atomic events. Assume Ann, Bob and
Claire play a card game with three cards: a red one, a
green one and a yellow one. They have only one card
and they only know the color of their cards. Ann has
the red card, Bob the green card and Claire the yellow
one. Then Ann and Bob show their card privately to
each other in front of Claire who therefore does not know
which card they show to each other. We model this exam-
ple by introducing the atomic facts Φ0 = {AhR,AhG,
AhY,BhR,BhG,BhY } and the atomic events Φ1 =
{AsR,AsG,BsG,BsG}. AhR stands for ‘Ann has the
Red card’, AhG for ‘Ann has the Green card’,. . . and so on.
AsR stands for ‘Ann shows her Red card’, BsG stands for
‘Bob shows his Green card’,. . . and so on. Pre(1) = 0 and
Pre(AsR) = AhR,Pre(AsG) = AhG,Pre(BsG) =
BhG,Pre(BsG) = BhG. Finally, Post(p0, p1) = p0 for
all p0 ∈ Φ0 and p1 ∈ Φ1 because these atomic events do
not change atomic facts of the world (also called epistemic
events in [Baltag and Moss, 2004]). The event of Ann and
Bob showing privately their card to each other in front of
Claire is depicted in Figure 2.
w1a : AsR,BsG
A,B,C
C
v1 : AsG,BsR
A,B,C
Figure 2: Ann and Bob show their cards to each other pri-
vately in front of Claire.
Applying Definition 2.6, we then obtain the usual pre-
conditions and postconditions: Pre(w1a) = Pre(AsR) ∧
Pre(BsG) = AhR ∧ BhG;Pre(v1) = Pre(AsG) ∧
Pre(BsR) = AhG∧BhR;Post(p, w1a) = Post(p, v1) =
p for all p ∈ Φ0. J
Example 2.11. (‘tub’ example) Let Φ0 = {p0, q0},
Φ1 = {p1, q1}, Φ2 = {p2}. p0 stands for ‘tub 2 is
full’ and q0 for ‘tub 1 is full’. p1 stands for ‘tub 2 is be-
ing filled’ and q1 for ‘tub 1 is being filled’. p2 stands
for ‘one truthfully announces that tub 1 is being filled’.
Pre(1) = 0 and Pre(2) = 1. Pre(p1) = ¬p0, Pre(q1) =
¬q0. Pre(p2) = q1. We have Post(p0, p1) = >,
Post(q0, q1) = > and Post(p0, q1) = p0, Post(q0, p1) =
q0. We also have Post(p1, p2) = p1 and Post(q1, p2) =
q1. In Figure 3 (up) is depicted the L1-model (M1, w1a)
representing the event whereby tub 1 is being filled but the
agents do not know wether it is tub 1 or tub 2 which is be-
ing filled: M1, w1a |= q1 ∧ (BA(q1 ↔ ¬p1) ∧ 〈BA〉p1 ∧
〈BA〉q1) ∧(BB(q1 ↔ ¬p1)∧ 〈BB〉p1 ∧ 〈BB〉 q1). In Fig-
ure 3 (down left) is depicted the L2-model (M2, w2a) rep-
resenting the event where one privately informs Bob that
tub 1 is being filled, Ann suspecting nothing about it. So
w1a : q
1,¬p1
A,B
A,B
v1 : ¬q1, p1
A,B
w2a : p
2
B
A
w2
′
a : p
2
A,B
v2 : ¬p2
A,B
Figure 3: (up) One of the tubs is being filled (M1, w1a);
(down left) one privately informs Bob that tub 1 is being
filled (M2, w2a) and (down right) one publicly announces
that tub 1 is being filled (M2′ , w2′a ).
we haveM2, w2a |= p2 ∧BBp2 ∧BA¬p2 which somehow
defines formally the notion of privacy: something happens
and agent B knows it but agent A believes it does not hap-
pen. In Figure 3 (down right) is depicted the L2-model
(M2
′
, w2
′
a ) representing the event where one publicly in-
forms Ann and Bob that tub 1 is being filled. So we have
M2
′
, w2
′
a |= p2 ∧ BAp2 ∧ BBp2 which somehow defines
formally the notion of publicness: something happens and
everybody knows it happens. J
3 A generic product update
As we said in the introduction, because the events we con-
sider might be processes, it is quite possible that an event
represented by Mk be updated by another event repre-
sented by M i. This gives rise to a generic product update
between Li-models whose definition is very similar to the
BMS one of Section 1.
Definition 3.1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and k = Pre(i).
Let M i = (W i, Ri, V i, wia) be a pointed Li-model and
Mk = (W k, Rk, V k, wka) be a pointed Lk-model such that
Mk, wka |= Pre(wia). We define the pointed Lk-model
(Mk, wka)⊗ (M i, wia) = (W ′, R′, V ′, w′a) as follows.
1. W ′ = {(wk, wi) |Mk, wk |= Pre(wi)};
2. (vk, vi) ∈ R′j(wk, wi) iff vk ∈ Rkj (wk) and vi ∈
Rij(w
i);
3. V ′(pk) = {(wk, wi) |Mk, wk |= Post(pk, wi)};
4. w′a = (wka , wia).
J
Example 3.2. (‘tub’ example) In Figure 4 is depicted
the product update of the models (M1, w1a) and (M2, w2a)
(up) and (M1, w1a) and (M2
′
, w2
′
a ) (down) of Figure
3. So we have (M1, w1a) ⊗ (M2, w2a) |= (q1 ∧
BBq
1) ∧ (BA(q1 ↔ ¬p1) ∧ 〈BA〉p1 ∧ 〈BA〉q1) ∧
BA
(
BB(q
1 ↔ ¬p1) ∧ 〈BB〉p1 ∧ 〈BB〉q1
)
: Bob knows
that tub 1 is being filled whereas Ann does not know wether
tub 1 or tub 2 is being filled and believes that Bob does not
know neither. We also have (M1, w1a) ⊗ (M2
′
, w2
′
a ) |=
q1 ∧ BAq1 ∧ BBq1: both Ann and Bob know that tub 1 is
being filled. J
w1a : q
1,¬p1
A,B
A,B
¬q1, p1
A,B
⊗ w2a : p2
B
A
¬p2
A,B
= (w1a, w
2
a) : q
1,¬p1
A
A
B
q1,¬p1
A,B
A,B
¬q1, p1
A,B
w1a : q
1,¬p1
A,B
A,B
¬q1, p1
A,B
⊗ w2′a : p2
A,B
= (w1a, w
2′
a ) : q
1,¬p1
A,B
Figure 4: (up) Product update for the private announcement
to Bob that tub 1 is being filled. (down) Product update for
the public announcement that tub 1 is being filled.
4 A general language
Definition 4.1. The language L is defined inductively as
follows.
L : ϕ ::= >k | ϕk | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | [i ends]ϕ | [i starts]ϕ
where k ranges over {0, . . . , N}, ϕk over Lk and i over
{1, . . . , N}. As usual, 〈i ends〉ϕ abbreviates ¬[i ends]¬ϕ
and 〈i starts〉ϕ abbreviates ¬[i starts]¬ϕ.
The language LSt is the language L without the operators
[i ends] and [i starts]. J
>k reads ‘an event of type k is occurring’, [i ends]ϕ reads
‘ϕ holds after an event of type i ends’, and [i starts]ϕ reads
‘ϕ holds when a new event of type i starts’.
We extend the function Pre to T = {>k | k ∈
{0, . . . , N}} by stating Pre(>i) = >k when Pre(i) = k.
4.1 The ‘static’ part: LSt
4.1.1 Semantics
Definition 4.2. A LSt-model M =
{(M0, w0), . . . , (Mn, wn)} is a non-empty set of
pointed Li-models (M i, wi) such that for all pointed
Li-model (M i, wi) ∈M (with i ≥ 1),
1. there exists a unique pointed Lk-model (Mk, wk) ∈
M with k = Pre(i) such thatMk, wk |= Pre(wi),
2. there is at most one pointed Ll-model (M l, wl) ∈ M
with i = Pre(l).
By notation, (M i, wi) ∈ M is supposed to be a pointed
Li-model. J
A LSt-model models the state of the world at a given time
t: each Li-model (M i, wi) of the LSt-model (for i ≥ 1)
models an actual event occurring at time t in the actual
world and the static properties of this world are modeled
by (M0, w0).
Definition 4.3. LetM = {(M0, w0), . . . , (Mn, wn)} be
a LSt-model and ϕSt ∈ LSt. M |= ϕSt is defined induc-
tively as follows.
M |= >i iff there is (M i, wi) ∈M
M |= ϕi iff

M i, wi |= ϕi
if there is (M i, wi) ∈M
M i,∅, wi,∅ |= ϕi
otherwise
M |= ¬ϕ iff notM |= ϕ
M |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff M |= ϕ andM |= ϕ′.
J
If there is no Li-model in M this means that no event of
type i is occurring and the agents all know that, i.e. that the
event modeled by the Li-model (M i,∅, wi,∅) is occurring
(defined in Section 2.2). That is why in that case the truth
value of a formula ϕi ∈ Li is determined by (M i,∅, wi,∅).
Note that it is quite possible that a Li-model inM is bisim-
ilar to (M i,∅, wi,∅) (i.e. contains the same information as
(M i,∅, wi,∅)). In that case we still have thatM |= >i al-
though no genuine event of type i is occurring. But because
this is a very marginal case, we prefer to keep the intuitive
reading of >i as ‘an event of type i is occurring’.
Example 4.4. (‘tub’ example) In Figure 5 is depicted the
LSt-model M = {(M0, w0a), (M1, w1a), (M2, w2a)}. So
we haveM |= [¬q0 ∧¬BAq0 ∧¬BBq0]∧ [q1 ∧BA(q1 ↔
¬p1) ∧ 〈BA〉p1 ∧ 〈BA〉q1 ∧ BB(q1 ↔ ¬p1) ∧ 〈BB〉p1 ∧
〈BB〉q1)] ∧ (p2 ∧ BA¬p2): tub 1 is not full but Ann and
Bob do not know it, and tub 1 is being filled but Ann and
Bob do not know wether tub 1 or tub 2 is being filled, and
one informs Bob that tub 1 is being filled but Ann believes
that nothing happens. So our language allows us to express
at the same time statements about static properties of the
world and about events occurring in this world. J
{ w0a : p0,¬q0
A,B
A,B ¬p0, q0
A,B
,
¬p0,¬q0
A,B
A,B
A,B
w1a : q
1,¬p1
A,B
A,B
¬q1, p1
A,B
,
w2a : p
2
B
A
¬p2
A,B
}
Figure 5: A L-model: tub 2 is full, tub 1 is being filled and
one privately informs Bob that this happens.
Some notations. Let M = {(M0, w0), . . . , (Mn, wn)}
be a LSt-model and let (M i, wi) ∈ M (with i ≥ 1).
PreM(M i, wi) is the unique Lk-model (Mk, wk) ∈ M
such that k = Pre(i). Finally for i ∈ {0, . . . , N},
we define last(i) = >i ∧ ∧
l∈Pre−1(i)
¬>l. So we have
M |= last(i) iff there is (M i, wi) ∈ M and there is no
(M l, wl) ∈ M such that PreM(M l, wl) = (M i, wi).
last(i) for i ≥ 1 reads ‘the last event which occurred and
which is still occurring is of type i’. last(0) reads ‘no event
is occurring’.
Definition 4.5. Let M = {(M0, w0), . . . , (Mn, wn)}
be a LSt-model such that M |= last(n). We
define ⊗(M) by ⊗(M) = M if n = 0 and
⊗(M) = {(M0, w0), . . . , P reM(Mn, wn)⊗ (Mn, wn)}
otherwise. J
So⊗(M) is justM updated by the most recent event when
this one ends.
Example 4.6. (‘tub’ example) If we take up the L-model
M of Example 4.4 then⊗(M) = {(M0, w0a), (M1, w1a)⊗
(M2, w2a)}where (M1, w1a)⊗(M2, w2a) is depicted in Fig-
ure 4. J
However, because the product update might change truth
values of atomic events, the preconditions of the possible
events might change during an update. So even ifM is a
LSt model, ⊗(M) is not necessarily a LSt-model. This
leads us to define the notion of L-model.
Definition 4.7. A L-model is a LSt-model which is sta-
ble under ⊗, i.e. a LSt-modelM such that ⊗(M) is a L-
model. J
We are now going to determine under which conditions a
LSt model is a L-model.
Definition 4.8. Let pi ∈ Φ0∪. . .∪ΦN . Post(pi) is defined
inductively as follows.
• Post(p0) = >;
• Post(pi) = ∧
pk∈Φk
(Post(pk, pi) → (Pre(pk) ∧
Post(pk))) if i ≥ 1 and k = Pre(i).
Then Posti is defined inductively as follows.
• Post0 = >;
• Posti = ∧
pi∈Φi
(
pi → Post(pi)) ∧ ( ∧
pi∈Φi
¬pi →
Postk) if i ≥ 1 and k = Pre(i).
Finally we define Post and Pre.
• Post = ∧
i∈{0,...,N}
(last(i)→ Posti);
• Pre = ∧
p∈Φ0∪...∪ΦN∪T
(p→ Pre(p)).
J
Pre characterizes condition 1 of Definition 4.2. Post(pi)
is a necessary condition for a LSt-model M to be a L-
model in caseM |= pi ∧ last(i).
Proposition 4.9. LetM be a LSt-model. M is a L-model
iffM |= Post.
4.1.2 Axiomatization
Let ϕ ∈ LSt. We write |= ϕ when for all L-model M,
M |= ϕ.
Definition 4.10. The logic LSt for the language LSt is de-
fined by the following axiom schemes and inference rules.
We write `St ϕ for ϕ ∈ LSt.
Li All axiom schemas and inference rules of Li
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , N}
A1 `St ¬last(0)→
∨
i∈{1,...,N}
last(i)
A2 `St last(i)→ ¬last(i′) for all i 6= i′
A3 `St ¬>i → En
(¬pi ∧ 〈Bj〉¬pi) for all n ∈ N
A4 `St Pre ∧ Post
J
Axiom A1 expresses that if at least one event is occur-
ring then one of these events is the most recent. Axiom
schema A2 characterizes condition 2 of Definition 4.2 and
expresses that there is a unique most recent event. Ax-
iom scheme A3 characterizes the special event of type i
(M i,∅, wi,∅) where nothing happens and this is common
knowledge.
Theorem 4.11. For all ϕSt ∈ LSt, |= ϕSt iff `St ϕSt.
Theorem 4.12. LSt is decidable.
4.2 Adding dynamics: L
4.2.1 Semantics
Definition 4.13. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The relations Riends
and Ristarts on L-models are defined as follows. Let M
andM′ be two L-models.
• M′ ∈ Riends(M) iff there is (M i, wi) ∈M such that
M′ = ⊗(M)
ifM |= last(i);
M′ ∈ Rlends ◦Riends(M)
where PreM(M l, wl) = (M i, wi), otherwise.
• M′ ∈ Ristarts(M) iff there is a pointed Li-model
(M i, wi) such thatM′ =M∪ {(M i, wi)}.
Let ϕ ∈ L. M |= ϕ is defined inductively as follows. The
boolean cases are as in Definition 4.3.
M |= [i ends]ϕ iff for allM′ ∈ Riends(M),
M′ |= ϕ
M |= [i starts]ϕ iff for allM′ ∈ Ristarts(M),
M′ |= ϕ
We write |= ϕ when for all L-modelM,M |= ϕ. J
If an event of type l presupposes an event of type i, i.e. if
Pre(l) = i, then if the event of type i ends then the event
of type l also ends. For example, if ‘Bob is opening a box
to look at a coin’ (p1) and ‘Ann is observing Bob opening
the box’ (p2) then Pre(p2) = p1. So if Bob stops opening
the box to look at the coin (¬p1), Ann stops observing Bob
opening the box (¬p2). This explains the inductive defini-
tion of Riends.
{(M0, w0), . . . , (Mk, wk), (M i, wi), . . . , (Mn, wn)}
Riends
{(M0, w0), . . . , (Mk, wk)⊗ . . .⊗ ((Mn−1, wn−1)⊗ (Mn, wn))︸ ︷︷ ︸
pointedLk-model
}
{(M0, w0), . . . , (Mn, wn)}
R
n+1
starts
{(M0, w0), . . . , (Mn, wn), (Mn+1, wn+1)}
Note that the above figures (where k = Pre(i)) also ex-
plain our reading of last(i) introduced in Section 4.1.1.
Example 4.14. (‘tub’ example) If we take up Example
4.4 then M |= [2 ends](q1 ∧ BBq1 ∧ BA(q1 ↔ ¬p1) ∧
〈BA〉p1 ∧〈BA〉q1): after the event of type 2 ends (i.e. after
the private announcement to Bob that tub 1 is being filled)
Bob knows that tub 1 is being filled while Ann still does
not know whether tub 1 or 2 is being filled. We also have
|= [2 starts](p2∧BAp2∧BBp2 → [2 ends](q1∧BAq1∧
BBq
1)): after any event where one publicly announces that
tub 1 is being filled everybody knows that tub 1 is being
filled. J
4.2.2 Axiomatization
In the BMS axiomatization one needs to refer to the
modal structure of the event model, introducing it hence-
forth directly into the language. In our axiomatiza-
tion we will also need to refer to it. However, we
will do so thanks to our languages Li and more par-
ticularly thanks to formulas δn, originally introduced in
[Balbiani and Herzig, 2007]. These formulas can com-
pletely characterize the modal structure of a Li-model up
to modal depth n [Balbiani and Herzig, 2007].
Definition 4.15. [Balbiani and Herzig, 2007] Let i ∈
{0, . . . , N}. We define inductively the sets Ein as follows.
• Ei0 = {
∧
pi∈S0
pi ∧ ∧
pi /∈S0
¬pi | S0 ⊆ Φi};
• Ein+1 = {δ0 ∧
∧
j∈G
( ∧
δn∈Sjn
〈Bj〉δn ∧Bj
∨
δn∈Sjn
δn
)
|
δ0 ∈ Ei0, Sjn ⊆ Ein}.
Let δn+1 ∈ Ein+1. δn+1 can be written under the form
δn+1 = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈G
( ∧
δn∈Sjn
〈Bj〉δn ∧Bj
∨
δn∈Sjn
δn
)
.
For all j ∈ G, we note Rj(δn+1) = Sjn and R0(δn+1) =
{pi ∈ Φi | `i δ0 → pi} J
Thanks to these formulas δn, we can now express what is
true in Mk ⊗M i, (wk, wi) on the basis of what is true in
(Mk, wk) and (M i, wi). Intuitively, Preδn(ϕ) in the next
definition is the formula that (Mk, wk) must satisfy so that
ϕ be true in (Mk, wk)⊗ (M i, wi), in caseM i, wi |= δn.
Definition 4.16. For all i, k ∈ {0, . . . , N} such that k =
Pre(i) we define for all n ∈ N the function Pre : Ein ×
Lkn → Lkn inductively as follows:
• Preδn(pk) =

∨{Post(pk, pi) | pi ∈ R0(δn)}
if R0(δn) 6= ∅
pk otherwise;
• Preδn(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) = Preδn(ϕ) ∧ Preδn(ϕ′);
• Preδn(¬ϕ) = ¬Preδn(ϕ);
• Preδn(Bjϕ) =
∧
δn−1∈Rj(δn)
Bj((
∧
pi∈R0(δn−1)
Pre(pi))
→ Preδn−1(ϕ))
J
Proposition 4.17. Let ϕk ∈ Lkn. Let (Mk, wk) be a
pointed Lk-model and (M i, wi) be a pointed Li-model
such thatMk, wk |= Pre(wi). Let δn ∈ Ein.
IfM i, wi |= δn then
Mk, wk |= Preδn(ϕk) iff (Mk, wk)⊗ (M i, wi) |= ϕk.
We are now ready to axiomatize the full language L.
Definition 4.18. The logic L for the language L is defined
by the following axiom schemes and inference rules. We
write ` ϕ for ϕ ∈ L. For all i, k ∈ {0, . . . , N} such that
Pre(i) = k:
LSt All axiom schemas and inference rules of LSt
A5 ` [i ends](last(k))
A6 ` [i ends]ϕ↔
∧{last(in)→ [in ends] . . .
[i1 ends][i ends]ϕ | i = i0, . . . , in and
Pre(il+1) = il}
A7 ` last(i)→ (〈i ends〉ϕ↔ [i ends]ϕ)
A8 ` last(i)→ ([i ends]ϕn ↔ ϕn)
for all n 6= i, k
A9 ` last(i)→(
[i ends]ϕk ↔ ∧
δn∈Ein
(
δn → Preδn(ϕk)
))
for all ϕk ∈ Lkn and n ∈ N
A10 ` [i starts]last(i)
A11 ` ¬last(k)↔ [i starts]⊥
A12 ` [i starts](t ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN )↔ (([i starts]t)
∨ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ([i starts]ϕi) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN )
where t is a boolean combination of elements of T
A13 ` last(k)→ (〈i starts〉ϕi ↔∧
{pi∈Φi|`Stϕi→pi}
Post(pi) ∧ Pre(pi))
for all ϕi ∈ Li such that ¬ϕi /∈ LSt
A14 ` [i ends](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([i ends]ϕ→ [i ends]ψ)
A15 ` [i starts](ϕ→ ψ)→ ([i starts]ϕ→ [i starts]ψ)
R1 If ` ϕ then ` [i starts]ϕ and ` [i ends]ϕ
J
Axiom A6 captures the fact when an event ends then this
implies that all the other events that depended on this event
also end (see Definition 4.13). Axiom A8 captures the fact
that only what is true about an event of type i and about
its preconditions are affected when this one ends; and sim-
ilarly for axiom A12. Axiom A9 captures Proposition 4.17.
Proposition 4.19. Let ϕ ∈ L. Then there is ϕSt ∈ LSt
such that ` ϕ↔ ϕSt.
Theorem 4.20. For all ϕ ∈ L, |= ϕ iff ` ϕ.
Theorem 4.21. L is decidable.
4.3 Embedding of the BMS framework
We add a common belief operator to our languages Li and
we assume as in BMS that the Li-models are finite (for
i ≥ 1). Let A = (E,R, Pre, Post) be an event model
with E = {a1, . . . , an}. We define the set of atomic
events Φ1 = {p11, . . . , p1n}, where Pre(p1i ) = Pre(ai) and
Post(p0, p1i ) = Post(p
0, a1i ). We define the pointed L1-
model t(A, a) = (W 1, R1, V 1, a) by W 1 = E,R1 = R
and V 1(p1i ) = {ai} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. t(A, a) can
be characterized3 by a single formula χ(t(A, a)) (thanks to
the common belief operator). We also define the operator t
from LBMS(A) to L by t(p0) = p0, t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ), t(ϕ∧
ϕ′) = t(ϕ) ∧ t(ϕ′), t(Bjϕ) = Bjt(ϕ), t(CGϕ) = CGt(ϕ)
and t([A, a]ϕ) = [1 starts](χ(t(A, a))→ [1 ends]t(ϕ)).
Theorem 4.22. Let A be an event model and ϕ ∈
LBMS(A). For all pointed epistemic model (M0, w0),
M0, w0 |=BMS ϕ iff {(M0, w0)} |= t(ϕ).
However, note that the ∗ operator of the BMS language
cannot be expressed in our framework.
5 Related work
Other languages for event models have been proposed
but none of them allows to express statements describing
events as such. In [Baltag et al., 1999], the event language
is the same as the epistemic language Le and one sets
A, a |= p when Pre(a) = p. In [Rodenha¨user, 2001], la-
bels are introduced that refer to the possible events of the
event model, as in hybrid logic. New operators are also in-
troduced: A, a |=↓1 ϕ means ‘any state reachable with a
makes ϕ true’ andA, a |=↓2 ϕmeans ‘any state that makes
ϕ true can be reached with a’.
At the outset of PDL [Pratt, 1976], a number of logical
frameworks called process logics were proposed to ex-
press what happens during the computation of programs.
As in PDL, the semantics of these frameworks all con-
sider a set of states (possible worlds) as given, and the
3A formula χ characterizes a finite and pointed Li-model
(M i, wi) iff M i, wi |= χ and for all finite and pointed Li-
model (M i
′
, wi
′
), if M i
′
, wi
′ |= χ then (M i, wi) is bisimilar
to (M i
′
, wi
′
).
primitive programs at stake are represented by accessibil-
ity relations (transitions) between states. All these log-
ics are propositional based and do not consider a set of
agents. In [Pratt, 1979], the language of PDL is augmented
with two additional operators ⊥ and [. If a is a path (i.e.
a sequence of primitive programs) and ϕ a propositional
formula then a ⊥ ϕ is true in w if at least one of the
states of any computation of a starting from w satisfies
ϕ. a[ϕ is true in w if in any computation starting from
w, if ϕ is true in some state then it remains true until
the end of the computation. One can show that our logic
is more expressive than Pratt’s process logic (yet with-
out the ∗ operator). In [Harel et al., 1982] the language
of PDL is augmented with two additional operators fϕ
and ϕsufψ: fϕ is true on a path if ϕ is true at the ini-
tial state of this path, and the operator suf corresponds
to the until operator of temporal logic [Pnuelli, 1977].
Their process logic is more expressive than Pratt’s pro-
cess logic [Pratt, 1979], Parikh’s SOAPL [Parikh, 1978],
Nishimura’s process logic [Nishimura, 1980] and Pnueli’s
Temporal Logic [Pnuelli, 1977]. This logic is refined
in [Harel and Peleg, 1985] where f and suf are re-
placed by chop and slice yielding a strictly more ex-
pressive logic yet still decidable. Another process logic
is defined in [Harel and Singerman, 1999] in the spirit of
[Harel and Peleg, 1985] which also models concurrency
and infinite computations. All these process logics have
in common to evaluate truth of formulas on paths (a state
being a path of length 0). This makes it difficult to com-
pare them formally with our framework since ourL-models
model what is true at a certain time and not throughout a
history of programs (a path). In that respect they cannot
express as we can that a primitive program is currently run-
ning but only express what is true at each step of a sequence
of primitive programs.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed a logical framework that really exploits
the potential of the BMS notions of event model and prod-
uct update. We showed that our framework embeds the
BMS one and is still decidable (yet without common be-
lief). Unlike any other logical framework it can express
statements about ongoing events (together with some static
properties about the world). From a conceptual point of
view, its formal structure reveals new aspects on the notion
of event and belief dynamics. Firstly, as we saw, our be-
liefs about an event occurring can also be updated due to
other events. Secondly, the set of all events has an internal
logical structure and the classical manichean distinction be-
tween event and fact is not fine enough to account for the
dynamics of beliefs.
A final remark on future work. In Definition 4.2, for sim-
plicity and technical reasons we assumed that there is at
most one pointed Ll-model with i = Pre(l) (condition
2). We can perfectly remove this assumption but then other
kinds of update product should also be introduced. Indeed,
assume that while tub 1 is being filled one publicly informs
the agents that tub 2 is actually full. The preconditions of
both events (the tub 1 being filled and the public announce-
ment) are of type 0. However, after this public announce-
ment, the agents know that tub 2 is full so they should
update their beliefs and infer that tub 1 is currently being
filled. Formally, this calls for the introduction of a ‘reverse’
update product which takes as argument a Lk-model and a
Li-model with Pre(i) = k and yields a new Li-model. We
leave the investigation of this new kind of update product
for future work.
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A Proof of Proposition 4.9
Lemma A.1. LetM be a LSt-model. Then
M |= Post iff ⊗M |= Pre ∧ Post.
Proof. 1. Assume M is a LSt-model such that M |=
Post. Assume w.l.o.g. that M |= last(i).Then M |=
Posti. Assume thatM |= ∧
pi∈Φi
¬pi. ThenM |= Postk
where k = Pre(i). But M |= Postk iff ⊗M |= Postk
because M |= ∧
pi∈Φi
¬pi. So ⊗M |= Postk. However
⊗M |= last(k) becauseM |= last(i). So ⊗M |= Post.
Besides, M |= Pre because M is a LSt-model. So
⊗M |= Pre because M |= pk iff ⊗M |= pk for all
pk ∈ Φk. Finally, ⊗M |= Pre ∧ Post.
2. Assume M is a LSt-model such that ⊗M |= Pre ∧
Post andM 2 Post. Assume w.l.o.g. thatM |= last(i)∧
¬Posti. Then ⊗M |= last(k). But because ⊗M |=
Post, we have ⊗M |= Postk. Now, M 2 Posti iff
M |= ∨
pi∈Φi
(
pi ∧ ¬Post(pi)) ∨( ∧
pi∈Φi
¬pi ∧ ¬Postk
)
.
2.1. If M |= ∧
pi∈Φi
¬pi ∧ ¬Postk then ⊗M |= ¬Postk
which is impossible.
2.2. IfM |= pi ∧ ¬Post(pi) for some pi ∈ Φi thenM |=
pi ∧ ∨
pk∈Φk
(
Post(pk, pi) ∧ (¬Pre(pk) ∨ ¬Post(pk))).
Assume that for some pk ∈ Φk M |= pi ∧ Post(pk, pi) ∧
¬Pre(pk). Then ⊗M |= pk ∧ ¬Pre(pk). So ⊗M 2 Pre
which is impossible.
Assume that for some pk ∈ Φk M |= pi ∧ Post(pk, pi) ∧
¬Post(pk). Then ⊗M |= pk ∧ ¬Post(pk). Then ⊗M |=
¬Postk. But ⊗M |= last(k). So ⊗M 2 Post which is
impossible.
So in any case we get to a contradiction. QED
Proposition A.2 (Proposition 4.9). LetM be aLSt-model.
M is a L-model iffM |= Post.
Proof. By induction on the number n of Li-models inM.
1. n = 1 clearly works.
2. Assume the result holds for n Li-models. LetM be a
L-model with n+ 1 Li-models. Then ⊗M is an L-model
by definition of a L-model and ⊗M has n Li-models. So
⊗M |= Post by induction hypothesis. Besides ⊗M |=
Pre because⊗M is aL-model. SoM |= Post by Lemma
A.1.
Assume that M is a LSt-model such that M |= Post.
Then ⊗M |= Pre ∧ Post by Lemma A.1. So ⊗M is a
LSt-model and ⊗M |= Post. So ⊗M is a L-model by
induction hypothesis. ThereforeM is a L-model. QED
B Proof of Theorem 4.11 and Theorem 4.12
Lemma B.1. Let i ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
`St last(i)↔
(∧
l∈I
>l ∧ ∧
l/∈I
¬>l
)
where I = {i0 = i, . . . , in = 0} such that Pre(ik) =
ik+1.
Proof. By Axiom A4 (Pre), `St last(i)→
∧
l∈I
>l.
Now assume that for some l ∈ I there is l1 /∈ I such that
Pre(l1) = l and 0St last(i)→ ¬>l1 , i.e. 0St ¬(last(i)∧
>l1).
But by Axiom A4, we have that
0St ¬ (last(i) ∧ >l1 ∧ ¬last(l1)), i.e.
0St ¬
(
last(i) ∧ >l1 ∧
(
>l1 → ∨
l2∈Pre−1(l1)
>l2
))
So 0St ¬ (last(i) ∧ >l1 ∧ >l2) for some l2 ∈ Pre−1(l1).
Then there are l1, l2, . . . , lm /∈ I such that Pre(li+1) =
li and Pre−1(lm) = ∅ because ({0, . . . , N}, P re−1) is a
rooted tree with root 0.
So 0St ¬ (last(i) ∧ >1 ∧ . . . ∧ >lm).
Then by Axiom A2 0St ¬(last(i) ∧ >m ∧ ¬last(m))
i.e. 0St ¬
(
last(i) ∧ >lm ∧ ∨
l′m∈Pre−1(lm)
>l′m
)
.
But Pre−1(lm) = ∅. So `St ¬
( ∨
l′m∈Pre−1(lm)
>l′m
)
.
Therefore we get to a contradiction.
So for all l ∈ I , for all l′ /∈ I such that Pre(l′) = l,
`St last(i)→ ¬>l′ .
However, because of Axiom A4 (Pre) and the fact that
({0, . . . , N}, P re−1) is a tree, we get that for all l /∈ I ,
`St last(i)→ ¬>l.
Finally, `St last(i) ↔
(∧
l∈I
>l ∧ ∧
l/∈I
¬>l
)
where I =
{i0 = i, . . . , in = 0} such that Pre(ik) = ik+1.
QED
Lemma B.2. Let ϕi ∈ Li. Then `St ¬>i → ϕi or `St
¬>i → ¬ϕi.
Proof. We define for all n ≥ 0 the formulas δ¬>in ∈ Ein
(see Definition 4.15) as follows.
• δ¬>i0 =
∧
pi∈Φi
¬pi.
• δ¬>in = δ¬>
i
0 ∧
∧
j∈G
(
〈Bj〉δ¬>in−1 ∧Bjδ¬>
i
n−1
)
for all
n ≥ 1.
Then one can easily show that for all n ∈ N, |=i( ∧
j∈G
∧
pi∈Φi
∧
m≤n
Em
(¬pi ∧ 〈Bj〉¬pi)
)
→ δ¬>in .
So `i
( ∧
j∈G
∧
pi∈Φi
∧
m≤n
Em
(¬pi ∧ 〈Bj〉¬pi)
)
→ δ¬>in .
Then `St
( ∧
j∈G
∧
pi∈Φi
∧
m≤n
Em
(¬pi ∧ 〈Bj〉¬pi)
)
→ δ¬>in
because of Li, and so for all n ≥ 1.
Therefore for all n ≥ 1,
`St ¬>i → δ¬>in (1)
But [Balbiani and Herzig, 2007] shows that for all ϕi ∈ Li
such that deg(ϕi) ≤ n,
`i δ¬>in → ϕi or `i δ¬>
i
n → ¬ϕi
So for all ϕi ∈ Li such that deg(ϕi) ≤ n,
`St δ¬>in → ϕi or `St δ¬>
i
n → ¬ϕi (2)
Finally, for all ϕi ∈ Li,
`St ¬>i → ϕi or `St ¬>i → ¬ϕi
because of (1) and (2). QED
Theorem B.3 (Theorem 4.11). For all ϕSt ∈ LSt, |= ϕSt
iff `St ϕSt.
Proof. Soundness is clear. For completeness, assume there
is ϕ0 ∈ L0, . . . , ϕN ∈ LN and t a boolean combination of
>i such that
0St ¬(ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t)
i.e. 0St ¬
(( ∨
i∈{0,...,N}
last(i)
)
∧ ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t
)
by Axiom A1
i.e. 0St ¬ (last(0) ∧ ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t) or . . . or 0St
¬ (last(N) ∧ ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t)
Assume w.l.o.g. that
0St ¬ (last(i) ∧ ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t) (∗)
By Lemma B.1,
`St last(i)↔
(∧
l∈I
>l ∧ ∧
l/∈I
¬>l
)
where I = {i0 = i, . . . , in = 0} such that Pre(ik) =
ik+1. So (∗) iff
0 ¬
(∧
l∈I
>l ∧ ∧
l/∈I
¬>l ∧ ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t
)
.
We now define the sets Siki of Lik -formulas inductively as
follows.
• Si0i = {ϕi0} ∪ {pi0 | ϕi0 `i0 pi0};
• Si1i = Si10 ∪ {pi1 | Si10 `i1 pi1} ∪ {Post(pi1 , pi0) |
Si10 `i1 Post(pi1 , pi0), pi0 ∈ Si0i }
where Si10 = {ϕi1} ∪ {Pre(pi0) | pi0 ∈ Si0}
• Si2i = Si20 ∪ {pi2 | Si20 `i2 pi2} ∪ {Post(pi2 , pi1) |
Si20 `i2 Post(pi2 , pi1), pi1 ∈ Si1i }
where Si20 = {ϕi2} ∪ {Pre(pi1) | pi1 ∈
Si1i or Post(p
i1 , pi0) ∈ Si1 for some pi0}
• Sik+1i = Sik+10 ∪ {pik+1 | Sik+10 `ik+1
pik+1} ∪ {Post(pik+1 , pik) | Sik+10 `ik+1
Post(pik+1 , pik), pik ∈ Siki }
where Sik+10 = {ϕik+1} ∪ {Pre(pik) | pik ∈
Siki or Post(p
ik , pik+1) ∈ Siki for some pik−1}.
Then by completion we define the sets Sik as follows:
Sik = Siki ∪ {¬pik | pik /∈ Siki } ∪ {¬Post(pik , pik+1) |
Post(pik , pik−1) ∈ Siki }.
So, because in the construction of the Sik , we used axiom
A4, Si0 ∪ . . . ∪ Sin is LSt-consistent.
So for all ik, Sik is Lik -consistent. Then by Theorem 2.8,
there is a finite and pointed Lik -model (M ik , wik) such
thatM ik , wik |= Sik .
So {(M in , win), . . . , (M i0 , wi0)} |= Si0 ∪
. . . ∪ Sin . But by construction of the Sik ,
{(M in , win), . . . , (M i0 , wi0)} |= Pre ∧ Post.
SoM = {(M in , win), . . . , (M i0 , wi0)} is a L-model and
M |= ∧
l∈I
ϕl ∧ ∧
l/∈I
¬>l.
But by Lemma B.2 `St ¬>l → ϕl for all l /∈ I . So by
soundness |= ¬>l → ϕl. Likewise ` ∧
l∈I
>l ∧ ∧
l/∈I
¬>l → t.
So finallyM |= ϕ0 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕN ∧ t. QED
Theorem B.4 (Theorem 4.12). LSt is decidable.
Proof. Decidability of LSt comes from the fact that the sat-
isfiability problem in LSt can be reduced to the satisfiability
problem in Li for each i ∈ {0, . . . , N} as the completeness
proof of Theorem 4.11 shows. In fact LSt has even the
strong finite model property. QED
C Proof of Proposition 4.17
Lemma C.1. Let n ∈ N∗, δn ∈ Ein and δn−1 ∈ Ein−1. If
M i, wi |= δn then for all vi ∈ Rj(wi),M i, vi |= δn−1 iff
δn−1 ∈ Rj(δn).
Proof. Due to the definition of δn. QED
Proposition C.2 (Proposition 4.17). Let ϕk ∈ Lkn. Let
(Mk, wk) be a pointed Lk-model and (M i, wi) be a
pointed Li-model such that Mk, wk |= Pre(wi). Let
δn ∈ Ein.
IfM i, wi |= δn then
Mk, wk |= Preδn(ϕk) iff (Mk, wk)⊗ (M i, wi) |= ϕk.
Proof. By induction on ϕk.
1. ϕk = pk works by Definition 2.6.
2. ϕk = ϕ ∧ ϕ′ and ϕk = ¬ϕ work by induction hypothe-
sis.
3. Assume deg(ϕ) = n and M i, wi |= δn+1 for some
δn+1 ∈ Ein+1.
Mk, wk |= Preδn+1(Bjϕ)
iff Mk, wk |= ∧
δn∈Rj(δn+1)
Bj(
( ∧
pi∈R0(δn)
Pre(pi)
)
→
Preδn(ϕ))
iff for all δn ∈ Rj(δn+1)
Mk, wk |= Bj
(( ∧
pi∈R0(δn)
Pre(pi)
)
→ Preδn(ϕ)
)
iff for all δn ∈ Ein, for all vi ∈
Rj(w
i), if M i, vi |= δn then Mk, wk |=
Bj
(( ∧
pi∈R0(δn)
Pre(pi)
)
→ Preδn(ϕ)
)
by Lemma
C.1
iff for all δn ∈ Ein, for all vi ∈ Rj(wi), if
M i, vi |= δin then for all vk ∈ Rj(wk) Mk, vk |=( ∧
pi∈R0(δin)
Pre(pi)
)
→ Preδn(ϕ).
iff for all δn ∈ Ein, for all vi ∈ Rj(wi) such thatM i, vi |=
δn, for all vk ∈ Rj(wk) such that Mk, vk |= Pre(vi),
Mk, vk |= Preδn(ϕ)
iff for all (vk, vi) ∈ Rj(wk, wi) Mk ⊗M i, (vk, vi) |= ϕ
by induction hypothesis
iffMk ⊗M i, (wk, wi) |= Bjϕ. QED
D Proof of Proposition 4.19
Lemma D.1. Let t be a boolean combination of >l. Let
i ∈ {0, . . . , N}. Then ` last(i)→ t or ` last(i)→ ¬t.
Proof. Because of axioms A1 and A2, one can prove that
` last(i)→
∧
k∈PRE(i)
>ik ∧
∧
l/∈PRE(i)
¬>il
where PRE(i) = {i0, . . . , ii = i | Pre(ik+1) = ik}. The
lemma then follows. QED
Proposition D.2 (Proposition 4.19). Let ϕ ∈ L. Then there
is ϕSt ∈ LSt such that ` ϕ↔ ϕSt.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈ L. Because of axioms A5 and A6, there
is ϕ∗ ∈ L such that ` ϕ∗ ↔ ϕ and such that every
occurrence of [i ends]ψ can be equivalently replaced by
last(i) ∧ [i ends]ψ.
Now we are going to show by induction on the number of
occurrences of operators [i starts] and [i ends] that for any
formula of the form of ϕ∗ described above there is ϕSt ∈
LSt such that ` ϕ∗ ↔ ϕSt.
1. If there is no occurrences of [i starts] or [i ends] then
the result is clear.
2. Assume there is n + 1 occurrences of [i starts] or
[i ends]. We pick the innermost occurrence which is of
the form [i starts]ψSt or [i ends]ψSt where ψSt ∈ LSt.
2.1. Assume it is of the form [i ends]ψSt.
Then by definition of ϕ∗, [i ends]ψSt can be equivalently
replaced by last(i) ∧ [i ends]ψSt in ϕ∗.
Now ψSt can be written equivalently under the form
ψSt ≡ (t0 ∨ ϕ00 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN0 )∧ . . .∧(tn ∨ ϕ0n ∨ . . . ∨ ϕNn )
where ϕil ∈ Li and the tl are boolean combinations of >i.
Assume w.l.o.g. that ψSt is of the form t ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN .
Then by axiom A7 ` last(i) ∧ [i ends]ψSt ↔ last(i) ∧(
[i ends]t ∨ [i ends]ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ [i ends]ϕN). Now by ax-
iom A5 and Lemma D.1, we have ` [i ends]t or `
[i ends]¬t. Then by axiom A7, one can show that `
last(i)→ ¬[i ends]t or ` last(i)→ [i ends]t.
So ` last(i) ∧ [i ends]ψSt ↔ last(i) ∧(
[i ends]ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ [i ends]ϕN) (1)
or ` last(i) ∧ [i ends]ψSt. (2)
In case of (1), ` last(i) ∧ [i ends]ψSt ↔ (last(i) ∧ ϕ0) ∨
. . .∨ (last(i)∧ [i ends]ϕk)∨ (last(i)∧ [i ends]ϕi)∨ . . .∨
(last(i) ∧ ϕN ) by axiom A8.
Now by axiom A9 there is χSt ∈ LSt such that ` last(i)∧
[i ends]ϕk ↔ χSt. Besides, by axiom A5, ` [i ends]¬>i.
But by lemma B.2 ` ¬>i → ϕi or ` ¬>i → ¬ϕi. So `
[i ends]ϕi or ` [i ends]¬ϕi and by axiom A7, ` last(i)→
[i ends]ϕi or ` last(i) → ¬[i ends]ϕi. So in both cases
there is χSt ∈ LSt such that ` last(i)∧ [i ends]ϕi ↔ χSt.
So in case of (1) there is ϕSt ∈ LSt such that ` last(i) ∧
[i ends]ψSt ↔ ϕSt. So eventually in both cases (1) and
(2), there is ϕSt ∈ LSt such that ` last(i)∧[i ends]ψSt ↔
ϕSt.
So we can replace [i ends]ψSt by ϕSt in ϕ∗ and the result-
ing equivalent formula has therefore one modality of the
form [i ends] or [i starts] less.
2.2. Assume it is of the form [i starts]ψSt.
We can assume w.l.o.g. that ψSt is of the form ψSt ≡
t ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN . Then ` [i starts]ψSt ↔(
([i starts]t) ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ([i starts]ϕi) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN) by
axiom A12. But ` [i starts]last(i) by axiom A10 and
` last(i) → t or ` last(i) → ¬t by Lemma D.1. So
` [i starts]t (1) or ` [i starts]¬t (2).
If (1) then ` [i starts]ψSt.
If (2) then ` [i starts]ψSt ↔ (([i starts]¬t) ∧
([i starts]¬t) ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ([i starts]ϕi) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN )
i.e. ` [i starts]ψSt ↔ (([i starts]⊥) ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨
([i starts]ϕi) ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN )
i.e. ` [i starts]ψSt ↔ (last(k) → (ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨
[i starts]ϕi ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN )) by axiom A11.
If `St ϕi then ` ϕi so ` [i starts]ϕi by R1. So there is
ϕSt ∈ LSt such that ` [i starts]ψSt ↔ ϕSt.
If 0St ϕi then there is χSt ∈ LSt such that `
[i starts]ψSt ↔ (last(k)→ (ϕ0 ∨ . . .∨χSt ∨ . . .∨ϕN ))
by axiom scheme A13.
So in any case there is ϕSt ∈ LSt such that
` [i starts]ψSt ↔ ϕSt.
So in any cases 2.1. and 2.2. there is a formula ϕ∗1 ∈ L
of the form expected such that ` ϕ ↔ ϕ∗1 and ϕ∗1 has n
occurrences of modalities [i starts] or [i ends]. We can
then apply the induction hypothesis. QED
Remark D.3. In the proof, we used the disjunction of cases
`St ϕi and 0St ϕi. Besides, in the axiomatization ax-
iom scheme A13 is quantified on formulas ϕi such that
¬ϕi /∈ LSt. This way of defining a proof system makes
sense because LSt is decidable. J
E Proof of Theorem 4.20
Theorem E.1 (Theorem 4.20). For all ϕ ∈ L, |= ϕ iff ` ϕ.
Proof. We only prove the soundness of A9, A12 and A13.
A9. Soundness of A9 comes from Proposition 4.17.
A12. LetM be a L-model.
1. IfM |= ¬last(k) then the result trivially holds.
2. IfM |= last(k) then
M |= [i ends](t ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN )
iff for allM′ ∈ Ristarts(M),M′ |= t ∨ ϕ0 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕN
iff for all M′ ∈ Ristarts(M), M′ |= t or M′ |= ϕ0 or
. . . orM′ |= ϕi or . . . orM′ |= ϕN
iff for all M′ ∈ Ristarts(M), M′ |= t or M |= ϕ0 or
. . . or M′ |= ϕi or . . . or M |= ϕN because M |= ϕl iff
M′ |= ϕl for all l 6= i
iff M |= ϕ0 or . . . or M |= [i starts](t ∨ ϕi) or . . . or
M |= ϕN
iff M |= [i starts]t or M |= ϕ0 or . . . or M |=
[i starts]ϕi or . . . or M |= ϕN because M |=
[i starts](t ∨ ϕ) iffM |= ([i starts]t) ∨ ([i starts]ϕi)
iffM |= ([i starts]t)∨ϕ0∨. . .∨([i starts]ϕi)∨. . .∨ϕN .
A13. Assume ¬ϕi /∈ LSt. Then ¬ϕi /∈ Li. So by Theorem
2.8 there is a pointed Li-model (M i, wi) such that
M i, wi |= ϕi ∧
∧
pi∈S(ϕi)
pi ∧
∧
pi /∈S(ϕi)
¬pi
where S(ϕi) = {pi ∈ Φi |`St ϕi → pi}.
LetM be a L-model such thatM |= last(k).
1. Assume thatM |= 〈i starts〉ϕi.
Then there is a L-model M′ ∈ Ristarts(M) such that
M′ |= ϕi. So M′ |= S(ϕi). But M′ |= Post ∧ Pre.
So M′ |= ∧
pi∈S(ϕi)
Post(pi) ∧ Pre(pi) by definition of
Post and Pre and because M′ |= last(i). Then M |=∧
pi∈S(ϕi)
Post(pi) ∧ Pre(pi).
2. Assume thatM |= ∧
pi∈S(ϕi)
Post(pi) ∧ Pre(pi).
Then M ∪ {(M i, wi)} |= Post ∧ Pre ∧ ϕi. So M′ =
M∪{(M i, wi)} is aL-model such thatM′ ∈ Ristarts(M)
andM′ |= ϕi. ThereforeM |= 〈i start〉ϕi. QED
F Proof of Theorem 4.22
Lemma F.1. Let (A, a) be a pointed event model and
(M1, w1) be a pointed L1-model such that M1, w1 -
t(A, a). Then for all pointed L0-model (M0, w0) such that
M0, w0 |= Pre(w1),
M0 ⊗M1, (w0, w1) -M0 ⊗A, (w0, a).
Proof. Let Z1 : M1, w1 - t(A, a). We then define Z :
M0 ⊗M1, (w0, w1) -M0, A, (w0, a) as follows:
M0 ⊗M1, (v0, v1) Z M0 ⊗A, (u0, b)
iff
v0 = u0 andM1, v1 Z1 t(A, b).
One can then easily show that Z is a bisimulation. QED
Theorem F.2 (Theorem 4.22). Let A be an event model
and ϕ ∈ LBMS(A). For all pointed epistemic model
(M0, w0),
M0, w0 |=BMS ϕ iff {(M0, w0)} |= t(ϕ).
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
1. ϕ = p0 clearly works. ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2,¬ψ work by
induction hypothesis.
2. ϕ = Bjϕ.
M0, w0 |= Bjψ
iff for all v0 ∈ Rj(w0),M0, v0 |= ψ
iff for all v0 ∈ Rj(w0), {(M0, w0)} |= t(ψ)
iff {(M0, w0)} |= t(Bjψ).
3. ϕ = CGψ. Similar to Bjψ.
4. ϕ = [A, a]ψ.
{(M0, w0)} |= t([A, a]ϕ)
iff {(M0, w0)} |= [1 starts](χ(t(A, a))→ [1 ends]t(ϕ))
iff for all finite and pointed L1-model (M1, w1)
such that {(M0, w0), (M1, w1)} is a L-model,
{(M0, w0), (M1, w1)} |= χ(t(A, a))→ [1 ends]t(ϕ)
iff for all finite and pointed L1-model (M1, w1) such that
M0, w0 |= Pre(w1), ifM1, w1 |= χ(t(A, a) then {(M0⊗
M1, (w0, w1))} |= t(ϕ)
iff for all finite and pointed L1-model (M1, w1) such that
M0, w0 |= Pre(w1) and M1, w1 - t(A, a), {(M0 ⊗
M1, (w0, w1))} |= t(ϕ)
iff for all finite and pointed L1-model (M1, w1) such that
M0, w0 |= Pre(w1) and M1, w1 - t(A, a), {(M0 ⊗
A, (w0, a))} |= t(ϕ) by Lemma F.1
iff if M0, w0 |= Pre(a) then M0 ⊗ A, (w0, a) |= ϕ by
induction hypothesis
iffM0, w0 |= [A, a]ϕ. QED
